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I. INTRODUCTION
Since the onset of the Least Developed Countries (LDC) debt crisis,
developing countries have adopted various measures to meet their exter-
nal debt servicing obligations. These measures include declarations of
moratoria, debt exchange through collateralization, debt buy backs and
debt-for-equity swaps.' Of these, debt-for-equity swaps have become the
most popular scheme for reducing debt servicing problems and attracting
new investments. Several countries have either implemented formal pro-
grams or are in the process of doing so. Accordingly, the programs are
the subject of extensive analysis and discussions.2
A typical debt-for-equity conversion involves a purchase of interna-
1. Moratoria are the suspensions of debt servicing payments. Debt buy backs involve a
repurchase by a country of its external debts at a discount. Chile and Bolivia are examples of
countries which have used this debt reduction scheme. Se eg. Truell, Chile Buy-Back of
Foreign Debt at Discount Set, Wall St. J., Sept. 22, 1988, at 4, col. 1. Debt exchange or col-
lateralization of debt involves the issue of new debt instruments in exchange for old debt.
These exchanges usually involve the issue of zero coupon bonds as collateral for the new debt
instruments. Mexico is one of the first countries to use this financing scheme. See Debevoise
& Misback, The Mexican Exchange Offer, REV. OF FIN. SERvIcES REQ., 66 (Apr. 1988).
2. See Rubin, Special Report No. 1104, in GUIDE TO DEBT EQUITY SWAPS, Special
Report No. 1104 The Economist Publication, (S. Rubin ed. 1987) [hereinafter Report 1104];
Evans, New Debts For Old-And the Swapper is King, EUROMONEY, Sept. 1987, at 72-112;
Schwarz, Regulating the Loan Market for Developing Country Debt, in FINANCE AND THE
INTERNATIONAL ECONOMY, The Amex Bank Review Prize Essays, 87-97 (J. Caverley & R.
O'Brien, eds. 1987); Cfirdenas, Argentina's New Debt to Equity Conversion Programme, INt'L
FIN. L. REv., Aug. 1987, at 32-34; Buchheit, Converting Sovereign Debt Into Equity Invest-
ments, INT'L FIN. L. Rv. Sept. 1986, at 10-14; Rodner, Venezuela's Debt Equity Swap Pro-
gram, INT'L FIN. L. REV., July 1987, at 32; Blackwell & Nocera, Developing Countries Develop
Debt-Equity Swap Programs to Manage External Debt, IMF SURVEY (July 11, 1988), at 226-28.
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tional bank debt by a nonbank resident or nonresident investor. The
purchase may be made on the secondary market or directly from the
selling bank. The purchased debt is then converted into local currency.
The proceeds from the conversion may be used to acquire approved eq-
uity investments or to extinguish local currency debts.
Rules of the debtor country govern the redemption of external debt
claims. These rules may be the foreign investment laws, exchange con-
trol laws or special regulations promulgated to gove.m such transactions.
This Article examines the modalities for converting foreign debt into
equity in Chile, Brazil, Argentina, Mexico, and the Philippines. It uses
the common features of the various debt conversion programs to analyze
their impact on the debt reduction efforts of these debtor countries and
their economies at large.
II. SECONDARY MARKET TRADING OF LDC DEBT
Since 1982, a secondary market for trading developing country debt
has emerged. The debts are sold at discounts ranging from twenty to
ninety percent, depending on the extent of the country's indebtedness.
The debts of the fifteen most heavily indebted countries are sold at steep
discounts in the secondary market.3
Trading in the secondary market has been slow due to a myriad of
factors, including the increase in the loan loss provisions,4 and uncer-
tainty regarding the impact that such transactions could have on the par-
ticipating bank's valuation of the remaining debts. The number and total
value of the transactions are directly related to the economic develop-
ments in the debtor countries, their debt management policies (e.g.
whether to impose a moratorium on debt servicing) and how these im-
pact upon the creditor banks' expectations, portfolio management strate-
gies, and the attitude of bank regulators towards the balance sheet
treatment of their outstanding claims. The uncertainty inherent in these
factors has made the larger banks reluctant to engage in active trading in
the market. The smaller European banks and the United States regional
banks, however, have taken a keen interest in trading in the market and
3. See Watson, Mathieson, Kincaid, Folkerts-Landau, Regling, & Atkinson, Interna-
tional Capital Markets: Developments and Prospects, IMF WORLD ECONOMIC AND FINAN-
CIAL SURVEYS 58 (Jan. 1988) [hereinafter International Capital Markets]. In late September
1987, the discount rate of the 15 countries averaged about 55 percent. The 15 heavily indebted
countries are Argentina, Brazil, Columbia, Ecuador, Morocco, Peru, Uruguay, Yugoslavia,
Bolivia, Chile, Cote d'Ivoire, Mexico, Nigeria, the Philippines, and Venezuela. Id. at 65.
4. Loan loss provisions refer to the practice of banks setting aside a certain portion of
their earnings as reserves against their bad LDC debts. Id. at 63-64.
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have attempted to reduce their debt exposure by selling their debts. The
total volume of trading has been estimated at between thirteen and eight-
een billion dollars, a small amount when compared with the approxi-
mately 300 billion dollars of debt restructured since 1982.1
Trading activities in the secondary market for LDC debts have ac-
quired a new impetus since Citicorp's announcement on May 19, 1987,
that it is increasing its loan loss reserves (approximating LDC debts) to
about three billion dollars. This move has prompted similar action by
the other money center banks and regional banks engaged in sovereign
lending. These loss loans provisions against LDC debt increased the debt
instruments available for conversion. Consequently, the prices of LDC
debts on the secondary market declined. The increased provisions also
meant an increase in the banks' primary capital and a decrease in the size
of their debt portfolios.
The secondary market's operation has been enhanced by the active
participation of several banks and investment firms which have devel-
oped expertise in handling transactions involving loan claims. So far,
two variations of debt conversion have dominated the market. The first
is a debt for debt swap among the commercial banks. This enables credi-
tor banks to concentrate their holdings in one country or diversify their
debt portfolios. The second type of transaction involves an outright sale
of the debts for currency, which finances equity investments in the debtor
country.
Other variations of debt conversion include debt for nature swaps,
debt for bonds or securitization, and debt for export swaps. All of these
have been used to a lesser degree.6
Smaller banks and regional banks no longer interested in lending to
debtor countries welcome the growth of the secondary market for LDC
5. Iad at 58-59.
6. Debt for Nature Swaps involve the conversion of debts to local currency, the proceeds
of which are used in the preservation and conservation of the environment. Countries which
have implemented debt for nature swaps include Bolivia and Ecuador. See Evans, supra note
2, at 112. On the other hand, securitization involves the substitution of tradeable financial
instruments for the debt of a country. Such financial instruments may be bonds. One example
of a country which has securitized its debts is Nigeria. See WoRLD BANK, ANNUAL REPORT,
INTERNATIONAL BUsINEsS CORPORATION DEBT EQUITY-SWAPS: How TO TAP AN EMERG-
ING MARKEr, 18 (1987) [hereinafter WORLD BANK]. Debt for Export Swaps involve creditor
banks exporting domestic products of a debtor country to offset part of their outstanding
claims against the country. Peru is an example of a country which has implemented such a
program. Brazil is contemplating the implementation of a similar program involving nontradi-
tional exports. See Brazil Debt Package to Offer Exit Bonds, . of Com., June 24, 1988, at 7a,
coL 3-4.
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debt. This market offers them a way out of the restructuring bind7 into
which they have been cast.
A. Mechanics of Debt Equity Swaps
A debt equity swap is a scheme through which the debt of a country
is exchanged for local currency equity in a local company. The conver-
sion of debt to equity is not a new development. In fact it was used prior
to the 1982 debt crisis. In 1965, Brazil permitted some nonresidents to
convert loans owed to them into equity investments at face value and at
the official exchange rates.' Also, in 1980, Turkey enacted legislation to
govern debt equity transaction. The Turkish scheme was aimed at set-
tling some 1.4 billion dollars worth of foreign debt claims in arrears.
Under the Turkish arrangement, creditors had the option of being paid
in foreign exchange over a period of ten years or in local currency paya-
ble on demand. Payments in local currency could be used for a variety of
transactions including the purchase of equity interests in government
parastals or private companies.
Generally, debt equity conversions follow a basic pattern: a bank to
which debt is owed sells the debt at a discount to the debtor country or to
a private investor. After purchasing the debt paper, the investor presents
it to the central bank of the debtor country, which then converts all or
part of the loan paper at the prevailing exchange rate into the domestic
currency at near face value. The investor uses the converted funds to
acquire an equity interest in a government or privately owned corpora-
tion. The redemption of loan claims for local currency is subject to a
number of conditions. The most common condition requires that the
redeemer use the converted funds to finance approved investments. The
redemption of the loan claim at a discount enables the investor to obtain
local currency at a lower foreign exchange outlay than otherwise
possible.
Debt equity swaps are commonly classified into three types. The
first involves the exchange of government or public sector debt for equity
in a private sector project, the second involves trading a private com-
pany's debt for an equity interest in that entity, and -the third involves the
trading of government or public sector debts for equity investments pur-
suant to a privatization of public sector industries.
In order to implement a debt equity conversion program, it is neces-
7. The restructuring bind refers to the frequent cycles of debt restructuring involving
debtor countries and their creditors.
8. Blackwell & Nocera, supra note 2, at 226.
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sary for the debtor country to obtain waivers of the sharing,9 prepay-
ment, andparripassu clauses10 in the agreements governing the debts to
be converted. This is important because payment prior to the stipulated
original maturity date can trigger mandatory prepayment clauses, oblig-
ing a borrower to prepay all creditors pro rata if he prepays any creditor.
Failure to seek the requisite waivers may also trigger the pari passu and
sharing clauses in other loan agreements. Furthermore, debt to equity
conversion schemes may result in preferential treatment of participating
creditors. This may be through a steady stream of payments of principal
and interest or dividends on their investments albeit in local currency. In
the absence of the requisite waivers, nonparticipating creditors may in-
voke the sharing provisions, which would compel the participating credi-
tors to share such payments pro rata with the nonparticipating banks.
To avoid this, the creditors participating in "new money" and debt re-
structuring arrangements require the imposition of certain restrictions on
repatriation of profits by the borrowing country.
I. SURVEY OF COUNTRY PROGRAMS
A. Chile
Prior to the implementation of a formal debt conversion program in
Chile, there had been a limited form of debt conversion.I' The Chilean
program was first instituted in May 1985. Its primary objectives are to
reduce Chilean external debt and take advantage of the discounts offered
on the depreciated loans. 2 Under the program, debt equity conversions
are negotiated on a case by case basis with investors.
The two principal provisions governing debt equity swaps in Chile
are Chapters XVIII and XIX of the Compendium of Foreign Exchange
Regulations of the Banco Central de Chile (Central Bank). Chapter
XVIII permits both natural and juristic persons, be they residents of
Chile or not, to acquire Chilean foreign debt instruments, which have an
9. Sharing clauses or provisions are common clauses found in syndicated loan agree-
ments which provide for pro rata sharing of payments received above the agreed payments by
all the syndicate banks. See White, Sharing Clauses in International Loan Agreements, in
PROSPECTS FOR INTERNATIONAL LENDING AND REsCHEDULINGS §§ 23.01-23.07 (3. Norton
ed. 1988).
10. ParriPassu clauses are clauses which ensure that all creditors receive equal treatment
from the debtor. This is a common feature in syndicated loan agreements. See P. GABRIEL,
LEGAL ASPECTS OF SYNDICATED LOANS 62-64 (1986).
11. This refers to the few cases of debt conversion which had taken place since 1977.
Blackwell & Nocera, supra note 2, at 227.
12. L WERRETT, GUIDE To DEBT EQUITY SWAPS IN KEY LATIN AMERICAN COUN-
TRIES 22 (1987).
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extended or original maturity of more than 365 days, from a Chilean
debtor (directly or through an agent). The debt eligible for conversion
under Chapter XVIII includes both private and public sector debt (i.e.,
Central Bank debt, State Bank (Banco del Estado) and private bank debts
and public and private company debts). However, conversions under
Chapter XIX include only Chilean external debts acquired by foreign
investors.
1. Chapter XVIII Investments
Chapter XVIII governs investments by Chilean nationals. Its pro-
visions were the first to permit Chilean nationals to buy the country's
external debts at a discount and exchange them for local currency or debt
instruments denominated in local currency. Under Chapter XVIII, a
buyer, acting through a financial intermediary, seeks Chilean debt for
sale at a discount and negotiates an agreement to purchase the debt in-
strument. The foreign debt instrument is redenominated at face value
into pesos at the official exchange rate. On the authority of the buyer, the
Chilean debtor collects the redenominated face value amount in cash or
exchanges it for a new debt instrument payable in pesos on terms mutu-
ally agreeable to the parties. The Chilean debtor must submit a sealed
bid to the Central Bank stating the total face value of the debt that the
buyer is willing to pay for the debt, in addition to a commission payable
to the Central Bank for the conversion of debt into local currency. Also,
there is a twenty percent value added tax on the commission.
The Central Bank sets preallocated ceilings for all debt conversions,
usually approximately forty to sixty million dollars per month, taking
into consideration market conditions and demand. 3 These factors influ-
ence the number of bids which are eventually selected for the fortnightly
auctions. If the bid is deemed acceptable, the Central Bank notifies the
seller (the Chilean debtor) and debits the account of the Chilean Bank
chosen to handle the transaction. The buyer, acting through its agent,
buys the foreign denominated debt obligation from the foreign creditor
with a one percent commission for the agent. The foreign denominated
debt instrument is then submitted to the Chilean Bank for conversion
into pesos at the official exchange rate and redeemed at a value equal to
the original value of the debt. This is done in accordance with the prior
sale agreement between the seller (the Chilean debtor) and the buyer.
13. See id. at 25. At the inception of the debt conversion program in June 1985, a
monthly ceiling of about 30 million dollars was established and the participation of local banks
was limited to 5 percent of their capital and reserves. This ceiling was later changed in July
1986 to about 60 million dollars and later reduced to 10 to 20 million dollars. Id.
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The Chilean Bank issues the buyer a new debt instrument and the origi-
nal debt is cancelled.14
2. Chapter XIX Investments
Conversions under Chapter XIX involve the acquisition by foreign
investors of Chilean external debts. Once the external debt is acquired
the investor then submits an application to the Central Bank for the con-
version of the foreign-denominated debt instruments into pesos. The ap-
plication should state the nature of the investment to be funded by the
converted debt. Typically, the investment must not be of a speculative
nature. When Central Bank debt, new money or restructured debt is
involved, the Central Bank will issue the investor dollar-denominated
debt instruments which are payable inpesos. These can be converted into
inflation indexed Unidades de Fomento (UFS) 15 within eighteen months.
Alternatively, the investor may convert the UFS, when it is ready to
make its investments, by selling them on the secondary market. When
the debt involved is not Central Bank debt, then the obligor must sanc-
tion the redenomination of the debt into pesos and the prepayment of the
debt.
Repayment may be made by either promissory notes or cash (pesos).
The method of payment and the discount obtained on the sale are usually
negotiated between the debtor and the note holder. This is one feature
which distinguishes the Chilean program from the Mexican program.
While the former exchanges debt at a negotiated discount, the latter does
so at a fixed discount. The only exception to the use of a negotiated
discount under the Chilean program is when the Central Bank is the
obligor. In that case, the debt is redeemed at one hundred percent of its
value in local currency.
3. Restrictions
Despite the liberal rules governing debt conversion in Chile, there
are a few restrictions. These relate to the divestment, remittance of prof-
its and dividends, and repatriation of capital. Dividends accruing from
debt conversion may not be repatriated for four years. Similarly, capital
14. Proceeds accruing from debt conversion may be used in repaying debts owed to do-
mestic financial institution or held as investment. It is also possible to acquire equity in local
firms without going through another process. The regulations under Chapter XVIII permit
the repatriation of capital lost through capital flight of previous years. Chapter XVIII does
not provide any list of projects in which converted funds may be invested.
15. Inflation indexed UFS are local financial instruments taking into consideration the
inflation index.
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repatriation is not allowed within the first ten years. An investor may
divest and invest in another venture with the permission of the Central
Bank, but the capital cannot be repatriated until the expiration of the ten
year period. This "lock in" provision is aimed at ensuring that foreign
exchange remittances are made on the same terms as the restructured
debt. Any local currency obtained through debt conversions may only be
used for approved investments.
In September 1987 the Chilean debt conversion scheme was ex-
panded to allow the formation of foreign investment societies. 6 These
societies are funded through the purchase of discounted debt and invest-
ments in Chilean shares and financial instruments. The societies are ex-
pected to hold sixty percent of their portfolios in shares of publicly
quoted companies and the rest in local bonds. One significant restriction
on the investment societies is that they are not permitted to hold majority
shares in any company.
4. Decree Law No. 600 Investments
This is the principal foreign investment law in Chile. Investments
under Decree Law No. 600 anticipate the infusion of new foreign ex-
change investments or physical assets. Section 2(e) of the decree autho-
rizes debt conversion. This conversion can only be carried out if the
investor specifically requests it. In such a case the investor and the Secre-
tariat for the Foreign Investment Committee negotiate the terms which
amend the original investment agreement. The amendment must include
an extension of the three year limit on remittance of profits and repatria-
tion of capital (as contemplated under the original Decree Law No. 600),
and investment for four and ten years, respectively, as required of Chap-
ter XIX investments. The different treatment of investments under De-
cree Law No. 600 and Chapter XIX is based on the fact that investments
under Decree Law No. 600 are more beneficial because they involve new
foreign exchange. Investments under Decree Law No. 600 are governed
by agreements between the State and the investor, while investments
under Chapter XIX are governed by a Resolution of the Executive Com-
mittee of the Central Bank. 7 These differences affect the degree of pro-
tection enjoyed by each investment. According to Francisco Garces,
investments under Decree Law No. 600 "are considered more traditional
and [therefore] rank higher in the view of the OPIC [Oversees Private
16. Blackwell & Nocera, supra note 2, at 227.
17. Garc6s, Foreign Debt Conversion In Chile, in GUIDE TO DEBT EQUITY SWAPS, supra
note 2, at 29.
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Investment Corporation], the EDC [Export Development Corporation],
and the ECGD [Export Credit and Guarantee Department]."' 8
Decree Law No. 600 also gives the investor the option of choosing
between two regimes of tax rates namely, rates generally applicable to
Chilean nationals or a fixed tax of 49.5 percent for ten years. Invest-
ments under Chapter XIX, however, are all taxed according to the rates
generally applicable to Chilean nationals. When the investment under
Decree Law No. 600 exceeds fifty million dollars, the fixed tax rate is
guaranteed for twenty years instead of ten years and the proceeds from
the investment are placed in a special escrow account overseas. This
safeguards the investors from shortage of foreign exchange when remit-
tances have to be made.
It is.important to note that Decree Law No. 600 offers better protec-
tion against exchange risks because it allows investors to use the Central
Bank's currency swaps. Foreign bank investors are allowed to freely en-
gage in foreign exchange transactions.
5. Results
Between June 1985 and May 1987, Chile's external debt was re-
duced by about 1,888 million dollars. Of this amount, 155 million dollars
represents debt capitalization under Section 2(e) of Decree Law No. 600;
714.1 million dollars represents Chapter XVIII (and Appendix 4)19 in-
vestments; 483.6 million dollars represents Chapter XIX investments;
68.3 million dollars accounted for portfolio swaps and 467.4 million dol-
lars represents changes in debtors and repayments by debtors.20 By the
end of May 1987, Chile's external indebtedness was reduced from 19,342
million dollars to 19,126 million dollars. This represents a significant
decrease in Chile's total external indebtedness. It has been estimated that
the debt conversion program saved Chile some 132 million dollars in in-
terest payments up to May '1987. This represents approximately seven
percent of both the medium and long term annual interest payments.21
Also, it is estimated that in 1986 about 385 million dollars in Chilean
capital invested abroad was repatriated through Chapter XVIII
investments.22
18. Id
19. See id. at 30.
20. Id.
21. Id
22. Schubert, Debt/Equity Swap: Definition and Context, Proceedings of Conference on
Debt Equity Swaps, HERITAGE FOUNDATION, Jan. 1987.
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B. Brazil
Brazil was the first country to institute a debt equity swap program
after the onset of the 1982 debt crisis.23 The program began as part of a
rescheduling package in 1983 as an attempt to reduce Brazil's external
debt and to attract foreign investment. Under this scheme, private sector
borrowers were required to deposit the cruzeiro24 equivalent of their for-
eign currency debts with the Central Bank as the loans became due.25
Some creditors reloaned those funds in Brazil, or bought equity interests
in local companies, while others sold their loans, and the right to use the
local currency deposit, to multinational corporations or institutiong in-
terested in investing in Brazil.
The Central Bank imposed restrictions on the repatriation of capital
and dividends. Repatriation of capital was not allowed before the sched-
uled date of repayment of the loan. Remittance of profits from the in-
vestment was not allowed to exceed the interest payments on the original
loan. In 1984, the Brazilian authorities limited authorizations for debt
equity swaps to the original creditors due to the government's concern
that the program's restrictions would hamper direct investment.
Between 1983 and mid-1987, about two billion dollars of Brazil's
external debt was converted into equity. 26 In February 1988, the origi-
nal debt equity swap program was suspended and a new program was
instituted.27 Its object was to increase the volume of transactions. In the
first quarter of its operations, Brazil's external debt was reduced by over
500 million dollars.
The principal regulation establishing the debt equity swap program
in Brazil is Central Bank Resolution 1416, issued on November 17, 1987.
Under the new debt conversion program, all of Brazil's external debt
which is subject to restructuring is eligible for conversion. The eligible
debt includes medium and long term credits (registered with the Central
Bank) arising from loans and financing which are foreign currency de-
posits with matured interests and principal, and other foreign currency
deposits held at the Central Bank. The ineligible debt includes interest
on foreign currency deposits as of February 20, 1987, as required by Res-
23. Blackwell & Nocera, supra note 2, at 226.
24. Brazil has since changed its currency twice, first to cruzado and more recently to new
cruzado.
25. Id.
26. Id.
27. See Stuber & Street, Brazil's Debt/Equity Swap Program, INT'L FIN. L. REV., Feb.
1988, at 33-35.
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olution 1263 which suspended the remittance of interest on external
loans.
1. Eligible Investors
The program recognizes two classes of investors: original creditors
and assignees. Original creditors who are party to any restructuring
agreements are required to obtain amendments to any existing restruc-
turing agreements to modify the prepayment and sharing clauses and to
provide for the securitization of Brazil's external debt.2" Assignee inves-
tors must ensure that the assignor creditor has obtained the necessary
modifications. Once the necessary modifications are obtained, Brazil is-
sues bonds on the international financial market. The conversion is sub-
ject to the following conditions: (1) with respect to Central Bank debt,
the creditor is expected to purchase Brazilian bonds; (2) where the eligi-
ble debt is owed by debtors other than the Bank, the creditor parties to
the restructuring agreements assume the responsibility of obtaining the
necessary modifications to the agreement; and (3) when assignees hold
any eligible debt, the original creditors assume the commitment to obtain
the necessary modifications to the agreement.
2. Restrictions
The Central Bank is vested with authority to limit the amount of
debt converted by any creditor. The exercise of this power is influenced
by the value of the bonds subscribed to by the creditors.2 9 There are also
restrictions on the transferability of investments. The permissible period
for the transfer of investments is twelve years starting from the date of
the investment. Remittance of profits and dividends accruing from the
investment is not allowed within the first four years of the investment.
Additionally, investments in certain sectors of the economy are re-
stricted. They include public utilities, communications, mining, banking
and finance, informatics, transportation, and agriculture. Conversion is
not allowed when it would result in direct or indirect foreign control of a
Brazilian company. Similarly, if the conversion involves a repayment
from public funds, or if the investors or any entities controlled by them
have, in the thirty-six months prior to the application for conversion,
remitted capital or capital gains, conversion may be denied.3" However,
28. Securitization refers to the exchange of the debt of a country for more tradeable finan-
cial instruments. See International Capital Markets, supra note 3, at 61.
29. Stuber & Street, supra note 27, at 34.
30. Id at 33.
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if the remitted capital or capital gains is returned to Brazil for reinvest-
ment, the conversion will most likely be allowed.
The proceeds of any debt conversion may not be used by the inves-
tor or any entities controlled by it to acquire any foreign investment.
However, they may be used to fund new projects, expand existing ones,31
or be invested in Foreign Capital Conversion Funds which are governed
by different rules.32 The proceeds of the conversion may also be used to
extinguish any outstanding medium or long term credits registered with
the Central Bank or loans covered by MF Advice No. 309 of August 29,
1983 and its successors.33 The later includes loans granted by the Cen-
tral Bank to public sector entities with the approval of the Finance Min-
istry to repay loans or financing guaranteed by Brazil.
3. Procedure
The conversion of debt to equity is done through an auction. The
Central Bank has established two ceilings for the bidding. One permits
fifty percent of the aggregate amount earmarked for the bids to be allo-
cated to specific projects in particular developments areas, i.e., projects
under the control of the Development Authority for the Amazon
(SUDAM) and the Development Authority for the Northeast
(SUDENE), in Esprito Santo and in the Jequitinhonha valley.34 The
other is for investments not located in special development zones.
4. Eligible Debt
Both public and private sector debts registered with the Central
Bank are eligible for conversion, but they also require government ap-
proval.31 Public sector debts are comprised of the debts of public corpo-
rations or entities registered in their name at the Central Bank. These
entities include the States, the Union, the Federal District, the territories,
agencies and instrumentalities, mixed-economy companies and founda-
tions, and any loans contracted under Resolution 63 of August 21,
1967.36 Resolution 63 permits Brazilian banks to borrow from foreign
31. Id.
32. Guimaraes, Brazil, INT'L. FIN. L. REv., Jan. 1988, at 40.
33. MF Advice No. 309 of August 29 is a note issued by the Ministry of Finance, hence
the prefix MF.
34. Stuber & Street, supra note 27, at 34.
35. The conversion of public sector debt into equity is subject to the prior approval of the
Special Secretariat for the Control of State Enterprises (SEST) and the Secretariat of the Na-
tional Treasury (STN).
36. Stuber & Street, supra note 27, at 34.
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financial institutions and also relend the proceeds to the final borrowers
public corporations.
Private sector debts are debts of private sector companies and, like
public sector debts, these debts must also be registered with the Central
Bank. Private sector debts can be converted into equity investments in
other private sector companies or public sector companies. This is also
true of deposits made at the Central Bank and governed by Circular 230
of August 29, 1974, and Resolution 432, June 23, 1977.11 These conver-
sions are also subject to ceilings set by the Bank.
5. Foreign Capital Conversion Funds
Proceeds accruing from the conversion of funds owed by or depos-
ited with the Bank may be used to purchase securities on the domestic
capital market or via Foreign Capital Conversion Funds. In Brazil, "se-
curities are considered as shares, founders' shares and debentures, and
their respective coupons, certificates of deposit of securities and any other
securities created or issued by Brazilian corporations at the discretion of
the CMN."131 Foreign capital investment funds are one of the investment
opportunities open on the Brazilian domestic capital market. The princi-
pal regulations governing Foreign Capital Conversion Funds are the pro-
visions of Attachment 11 to Resolution 1289, March 20, 1987.
Attachment 11 contains the operative rules for the incorporation, opera-
tion, and management of Foreign Capital Investment Funds. Prior au-
thorization of the Securities Commission (CVM) is required for the
formation of a Foreign Capital Conversion Fund. Such funds are not
allowed to have more than five percent of the voting capital, or twenty
percent of the total capital, of any particular company in its portfolio.
Foreign Capital Conversion Funds are not granted any favorable treat-
ment. Any income distributed to the foreign quota holders is taxed.
Compared to Chile, the Brazilian debt conversion program has
many restrictions. It is yet to be seen whether this will influence the
inflow of foreign investment.
C. Argentina
Argentina's debt equity swap program was first announceol in June
1986 and was instituted pursuant to Ministry of Economy (ME) Resolu-
tion 520 on June 24, 1987, and Central Bank Circular A 1035, dated
37. Icd
38. Id
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June 1, 1987. 39 The program was modified in October 1987.40 The mod-
ification adopted a more pragmatic approach towards issues such as
matching funds. Under the old program, a foreign investor had to invest
a dollar for every dollar of debt converted. Under the amended program
the matching funds requirement is relaxed, to approximately thirty per-
cent of the investment. Additionally, the matching funds are not re-
quired to be in foreign exchange. The original Argentine program was
considerably more restrictive than either the Chilean or the Brazilian
program. This was due to three main factors: (1) fear of the program's
effect on monetary and fiscal policies; (2) political opposition arising
from nationalist groups who argued that the program was a ruse
designed to exchange non-performing debts for viable Argentine assets;
and (3) concern about the possible increase in Argentina's domestic
debts. Because of these factors, "the agreed programme... [was] almost
entirely based on the ... government's proposal, [and was] designed to
meet these misgivings. "41
1. Eligible Debts
Under Circular A 1035, all private and public sector debts are eligi-
ble for conversion except short term trade credits, alternative participa-
tion instruments (API's), and debts owed to official agencies or
guaranteed or insured by official Argentine agencies. Some types of debts
require the fulfillment of certain conditions before they can be con-
verted.42 For example, promissory notes issued or held in connection
with guaranteed private sector debts must have the guarantees cancelled
before they can be eligible for conversion under the program. Similarly,
private sector debts carrying foreign exchange coverage must also have
the coverage cancelled before being converted. Private sector borrowers
seeking to convert their debts must obtain the consent of all their credi-
tors and the Central Bank, to avoid possible breaches of any of the terms
of the loan agreements.43
The conversion of public debts covers the following: (1) nominative
bonds in dollars; (2) obligations of the national government in dollars; (3)
39. For details of the Argentine Program, see Joint Communique No. 7691 of the Minis-
try of Economics. See also Report 1104, supra note 2, at 182-91; Cfirdenas, supra note 2, at 32-
34; WORLD. BANK, supra note 6, at 95-105.
40. U.E.P. Res. 922 (Oct. 18, 1987) (and complimentary provisions); U.E.P, Res, 20
(Nov. 5, 1987); and Argentine Central Bank (BCRA) Communication Al 109, Oct. 27, 1987
[hereinafter BCRA].
41. Report 1104, supra note 2, at 182.
42. Id. at 183-84.
43. See Global Debt, The Equity Solution, 38 EUROMONEY, SPEC. SUPP. (1988).
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interim obligations of the national government in dollars; (4) external
bonds of the Argentine Republic; (5) other foreign loans granted to the
national government; (6) credit and deposit facilities for current deposits
at the Central Bank; (7) Central Bank obligations in dollars and interim
obligations in dollars; (8) medium term loans granted to the Central
Bank; (9) other foreign debts of the Central Bank; (10) guaranteed public
sector refinanciation contracts; and (11) other foreign obligations of the
public sector, excluding short term commercial obligations and credits
which have been granted or guaranteed by foreign official offices. 44 Cir-
cular A 1109 allows creditors of such securities to present them to the
Central Bank and request the Bank, at the order of an investor, to invest
converted funds in an approved project which has been favored in the
bidding system.45 The proceeds of the conversion may be used in financ-
ing up to about seventy percent of the total cost of an approved project.
This percentage excludes the costs of imported equipment. The remain-
ing thirty percent may be financed in foreign exchange, australs or by
third parties.
2. Eligible Investments
Eligible investments are governed by Article 4 of Resolution (ME)
922. They include: (1) purchasing new equipment; (2) building new in-
dustrial plants or expanding existing industries with a view to increasing
their current productive capacity; and (3) any other investments which
increase productivity, efficiency, the supply of goods and services, and
contribute to improving the country's balance of payments. Eligibility is
determined by the Under Secretariat for Economic Policy (UEP) within
forty-five days of receiving all the necessary information relating to the
project. The list of eligible investments is fairly general, the purpose of
which is to attract investments which will contribute to increased pro-
duction and supply of goods for export.
Like the Chilean program, the Argentine program is accessible to
local and foreign investors alike. Both investors are subject to the same
regulations but foreigners must also comply with regulations laid down
in Foreign Investment Law 21,382, as amended by Law 22,208. 41
Despite the general nature of the description of eligible investments
44. BCRA, supra note 40.
45. See Bomchil & Eduardo, New Conversion Programme in Argentina, INrL. FIN. L.
REv., Feb. 1988, at 36.
46. Australs is the currency of Argentina.
47. It permits a wide variety of foreign investment including capitalization of eligible for-
eign debts. See Cirdenas, supra note 2, at 32.
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under the program, some projects are specifically excluded. These in-
clude: (1) the acquisition of real estate; (2) quota!;, shares, and other
corporate participations; and (3) the acquisition of movable assets such
as those previously installed in other industrial plants. Also, projects
generally requiring government incentives such as tax and other benefits
are excluded from the program, except for the importation of capital
goods under Decree 515/87. In that case the company must provide
matching funds on a one to one basis. Also the goods must be financed
for a term of six years with a four year grace period.
3. Conversion Process
When a project is approved as an eligible investment by the UEP,
the investor must participate in a monthly or bimonthly bidding organ-
ized by the Central Bank to award the debt conversion funds. Annual
quotas and monthly or bi-monthly debt limits are determined by the
UEP in conjunction with the Central Bank.4" The Central Bank reserves
the right to increase the limits when necessary to cover approved
projects.
The process of debt conversion begins with an investor presenting a
proposal to the UEP in the Ministry of Economy for approval. This is
followed by a conversion request made by an investor or a bank interme-
diary acting on behalf of an investor to the Central Bank. The conver-
sion request should be accompanied by documentation showing the
availability of matching funds, at least up to the amount of debt to be
converted, a description of the matching funds, a conversion guarantee (a
guarantee that the eligible debt and the matching funds will be provided),
and an unconditional written acceptance of the regulations governing the
debt equity swap program in writing.
The required matching funds must comprise fresh funds provided
by the investor. Those funds are funds not obtained under the swap pro-
gram. They include, inter alia, long term private loans with a minimum
term of six years and a grace period of four years, 9 foreign exchange
denominated bonds (Bonex bonds) used by companies to remit their
funds overseas, funds obtained from multilateral agencies such as the In-
ternational Finance Corporation and the Inter-Amaerican Investment
Corporation, and up 'to fifty percent of other funds obtained outside the
country and used in financing imports into Argentina.
The conversion guarantee amounts to one percent of the debt to be
48. Res. ME 922 art. 2.
49. R. WERRE-rr, supra note 12, at 66.
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converted. The conversion guarantee may be made either by a deposit in
a bank authorized to deal in foreign exchange or by a bank guarantee.5"
In the case of the former, the funds are held as a reserve requirement at a
nonregulated interest rate.
All conversion requests are subject to a public bidding held every
two months, during which all projects are considered on a case by case
basis. Every bid is assigned a certain number of points. The points are
based on the type of debt converted and the proportion of matching
funds provided. In the event that the bids exceed the bimonthly quota,
priority may be given to bids involving greater percentage of matching
funds.
Within four days of bidding, investors are notified of conditional
acceptances or rejection of their proposals. In the following fifteen days,
the investors are required to file the securities to be converted with the
Central Bank. It analyzes them and within six days of its analysis gives
the investor notice of a definite award. 1
Three days after the definite award is made, the BCRA converts the
securities, less the commissions and discount received. The resulting
amount is then deposited in a local bank in the name of the investor. The
investor has the option of receiving interest on the deposit according to a
financial index established by the Central Bank, at the prevailing market
rate or at the Libor rate.52  When the conversion request is rejected,
the "conversion guarantee" funds are returned to the investor with inter-
est at a nonregulated rate or at a rate indexed to the official exchange
rate. These deposits may be assigned to a firm in which the investment is
to be made.
The local currency is disbursed according to a schedule presented
as part of the project proposal approved by the Ministry of Economy.
The bank intermediary informs the Central Bank that the funds have
been used for the project as indicated in the schedule.
4. Restrictions
Like the other programs, the Argentine program also has some re-
strictions. For example, the capital investment participations accruing
from the conversion of public external debt securities may not be sold or
assigned to other investors within the first three years of their conversion.
50. Report 1104, supra note 2, at 186.
51. The bidding awards are granted on a provisional basis, subject to the production to
the central bank of all relevant bank documentation.
52. Bomchil & Eduardo, supra note 45, at 37.
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Also, the capital may not be repatriated during the first ten years of the
investment and profits may not be remitted within the first four years of
the investment. But if the investor assigns participation after the first
three years and before the expiration of the ten years repatriation restric-
tion, the investor is entitled to purchase foreign currency provided that
the investor establishes a fixed term foreign currency deposit with an offi-
cial bank. The deposit covers the remaining period of the repatriation
restriction.
To facilitate effective record keeping, the UEP has established a
Registry of Investments under the Conversion of Public External Debt
Programme (Codex registry). This registry is independent of the Regis-
try of Foreign Investments. It records all investments made by both lo-
cal and foreign investors using funds from debt conversions. It also
monitors all assignments or modifications in shareholders participations,
and performs any other activities which the UEP considers necessary.
In conclusion, the Argentine program "is endowed with modest
objectives that suggest its use will be limited. However, on the plus side,
the investment criteria are broad and the program may be used by Ar-
gentine citizens who wish to convert their own debt instruments. 51 3
D. Mexico
The Mexican debt conversion program was first authorized in April
1986. Although the primary object of the program was to "cancel public
sector debts, reducing the government's foreign debt servicing costs,"54
the Mexican government is promoting the mechanism primarily as an
incentive to investors.
The conversion process begins when a prospective investor files an
application to participate in the debt capitalization program, acting by
himself or through a bank intermediary. The application is accompanied
by a processing fee which is about 0.25 percent of the face value of the
debt to be converted.55 The applications are submitted to the Public
Credit Directorate of the Ministry of Finance, which reviews them and
then forwards them to the National Foreign Investment Commission
with a recommendation for approval. Although the Commission is not
bound by the Ministry's recommendations, it usually approves projects
based on its recommendations. Upon approval, the Ministry of Finance
issues an official letter of agreement stating the amount, the terms, the
53. R. WERRETr, supra note 12, at 37.
54. Report 1104, supra note 2, at 102.
55. The fee used to be about 85,000 pesos.
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origin of the debt paper, and the discount at which it was exchanged.
The investor purchases the debt from the bank creditor and the debtor is
then discharged of his obligations to the creditor. The Ministry of Fi-
nance informs the bank creditor of the exchange and requests cancella-
tion of principal and the termination of interest payments. To obtain the
debt instruments for conversion, two formal agreements are necessary.
The first is a stock purchase agreement, which is between the appropriate
Mexican government agency, the debtor, and the Mexican company in
which the investment is to be made. The second agreement is between
the investor and the bank holding or selling the debt paper.
Following the approval of the project, the project is ready for the
exchange of the foreign denominated debts into pesos. The eligible debt
for the transaction is obtained on the secondary market or from a bank.
The conversion may also be arranged by a bank intermediary acting on
behalf of an investor. Bank intermediaries charge fees which range be-
tween four percent of the exchanged debt to a flat fee of about twenty
thousand dollars. The active bank intermediaries in Mexico include
Banco de Comercio (Bancomer) and Banco Nacional de Mexico
(Banamex)5 6 These banks act in conjunction with foreign financial serv-
ices firms.57 The debt paper is converted at a rate equal to the average of
the bid and offer rates issued by Mexican commercial banks in Mexico
City at the beginning of the business day on which payment is to be
made.
The proceeds of the conversion are kept in a controlled account held
by the Ministry of Finance. Such funds earn interest at the rate of Cur-
rent Mexican Treasury Certificates (Cetes). The Ministry of Finance dis-
burses the funds in accordance with a schedule contained in the approved
application. It pays the funds directly to the investors, creditors, suppli-
ers, and other beneficiaries for any services provided. Creditors are ex-
pected to issue receipts covering any transactions between them and the
investor. All such receipts and invoices are submitted to the Ministry for
approval. The receipts must correspond to a budget line item in the ap-
proved conversion application.
1. Eligible Investments
Eligible investments under the program are prioritized by the gov-
56. See Report 1104, supra note 2, at 103; R. WERRETr, supra note 12, at 46-47.
57. For example, Sherson Lehman Brothers works closely with Banamex, and Libra Bank
also works closely with Bancomer. Other foreign banks which have been active in swap trans-
actions in Mexico include Deutsche Bank, Chemical Bank, Citicorp, and Manufacturers
Hanover.
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ernment. High priority projects include privatization of state-owned
companies. These are referred to as category 0 investments, and include,
inter alia, export-oriented investments, investments in high technology
and investments in manufacturing, with a higher percentage of domestic
content. Investors in high priority projects are allowed to redeem the
debt at full face value. On the other hand, debt conversion for low prior-
ity investments are allowed at seventy-five percent of their full value in
pesos. It is important to note that the discounts are not on the original
value of the dollar denominated debts as quoted on the secondary mar-
ket. Instead they are on the full face value of the debt in pesos.
Most of the large swap transactions that have taken place have been
category three transactions. These transactions permit the redemption of
debt at an eight percent discount. This category is composed mainly of
investments in high-technology, in the manufacturing sector, and indus-
tries relocating to designated development zones outside large Mexican
cities. During the first phase of the program, the Mexican authorities
approved 110 million dollars every month for swap transactions.
In 1987 a temporary ceiling of 1.5 billion dollars was set for debt
conversion. In March of that year, the Mexican government suspended
the program. The suspension was carried into effect before the signing of
a new money agreement involving twelve billion dollars in new commit-
ments. During the negotiation of the new money agreement, the Mexi-
can government used the program as leverage to obtain cooperation from
recalcitrant bank creditors. It threatened to exclude such banks from
participating in the conversion process by declaring their debts ineligible
for conversion and also by denying them any role as agents or in-
termediaries for potential investors.s Fortunately, the threat was not
carried out. Instead, the government used the program to increase eq-
uity capital in the private sector. So far, large multinational corporations
such as Volkswagen, Chrysler, Nissan, and Ford, all private sector man-
ufacturing industries, have used the program to expand their activities in
Mexico.59 The largest conversion was made by Volkswagen, which ex-
changed 141 million dollars of Mexican government debt, valued at 85
million dollars on the secondary market, for 125 million dollars worth of
pesos: The transaction was arranged by Deutsche Bank on December 5,
1986.1 Nissan exchanged sixty million dollars in Mexican government
debt to expand its plant in Mexico.
58. Report 1104, supra note 2, at 104.
59. Id. at 104-05.
60. Id. at 105
[Vol. 12
Debt Equity Swap Programs
Debt swaps have also been used in moderate amounts to expand
Mexico's tourist industry. For example, Club Med is financing a new
hotel in Huatulco through a swap transaction involving three million
dollars. In another hotel venture, Somex, a Mexican state investment
Bank, and Japan Airlines are financing a hotel (Hotel Nikko) through a
joint venture.
Privatization of government industries has also been carried out us-
ing debt swaps. Komatsu, a Japanese tractor company, used a swap
transaction to increase its shares in Dina-Komatsu, a joint venture with a
Mexican State company. Heavily indebted Mexican private sector com-
panies have also participated in the debt equity swap program. One of
the largest participants is the Alfa Group, Mexico's most profitable pri-
vate sector company in 1978-8l.61 An agreement in principle has already
been reached between the Alfa Group and its foreign creditors. Under
that agreement, 920 million dollars of the group's debt will be traded for
25 million dollars in cash, 200 million dollars in Mexican government
debts, and forty-five percent of the group's equity shares. Plans are also
under way to exchange the foreign debts of other private sector compa-
nies for equity shares in several other companies.
To facilitate the repayment of private sector debts, the government
of Mexico has established a trust fund calledficorca, which guarantees
repayment to foreign creditors. Under this scheme, the indebted compa-
nies liquidate their debts in pesos at a preferential exchange rate. The
foreign debts are then rescheduled over a term of twenty years, as in the
case of public sector debts. The prepayment of the debts is facilitated by
an agreement entered into between the private company and ficorca,
pursuant to which the Finance Ministry acquires the company's debts.
After the transfer of the debts the company obtains permission to pay
ficorca the equivalent of the debt in pesos.
2. Public Sector Debts
There are four classes of Mexican government debts: (1) direct
loans obtained by the government of Mexico since 1982; (2) direct loans
granted under the Restructuring Agreement;62 (3) private sector debt
guaranteed by the Government under the ficorca scheme, (such debts
were made eligible for conversion under Mexico's 1987 rescheduling
Agreement, and are exchanged within one percent of the other Mexican
61. Id. at 106.
62. As amended by March 29, 1987. The New Restructuring Agreements were signed
between Mexico and its creditors on August 29, 1985, and later rescheduled under the 1986-87
Agreement concluded on March 20, 1987.
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government debts); and (4) restructured debts of government parastatals,
such as the State Electric and Power Company (Comision Federal, de
Electricida (CFE)), the State Food Procurement and Distribution and
Retail Agency (Compania Nacional de Subs istencias Populares
(Conasupo)) and Mexico City's Municipal government (Departmento del
Distrito Federal (DDF)).
3. Regulation
Until the Mexican debt equity swap program was suspended in
1987, it was regulated by Mexico's Foreign Investment laws.63 Under
the March 20, 1987 rescheduling agreement, Clause 5.11 was amended to
permit the participation of Mexican companies in the program. Mexican
companies participating in the program must show that the funds used to
purchase the debt papers are funds obtained from their overseas activi-
ties. As a result of this development, the Mexican authorities are revising
the country's tax laws to accommodate profits accruing from debt equity
swap transactions. The National Foreign Investment Commission is the
body responsible for administering the foreign investment laws of Mex-
ico. Its consent is not required in all cases relating to investment in Mex-
ico, especially when the foreign investor holds less than fifty-one percent
of the investment capital and does not control the company.
Foreign investment of up to one hundred percent is allowed in in-
bound companies under Resolution 2 of the Law of Foreign Invest-
ments. 64 However, when the acquisition of an existing Mexican com-
pany is concerned, the approval of the Commission is required, especially
when the foreign investor contributes more than twenty-five percent of
the capital or the investor intends to hold more than forty-nine percent of
the company's fixed assets. The Commission approves projects after con-
sultations with the Ministries responsible for the sectors in which the
investment is intended to be made.
Investment related activities which do not require the consent of the
National Foreign Investment Commission include increasing a foreign
partner's share in a company in which the partner already holds more
than fifty percent of the shares and transferring assets or stocks among
63. These laws were a set of regulations issued by the Ministry of Finance including the
terms of Clause 5.11 of the New Money Arrangements covering direct loans to Mexico, the
Restructuring Agreements modified by the amendment date March 29, 1987 and the New
Restructure Agreements of August 29, 1985 for the United Mexican States and Mexican Pub-
lic Sectors Obligors. See Manual Operativo Para la Capitalization de Pasivos y Sustituclon de
Dueda Publica por Inversion
64. Report 1104, supra note 2, at 109.
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foreign investors.65
Unlike general foreign investments, all debt equity swap transac-
tions require the authorization of the National Foreign Investment Com-
mission (NFIC) in addition to authorization from the Ministry of
Finance and Public Credit. While the latter is concerned with the techni-
calities of the investment, the former is concerned with the actual invest-
ment. Furthermore, investments must meet the requirements of the Law
of Transfer of Technology administered by the Mexican Ministry of
Trade even though this is not expressly written into the regulations gov-
erning debt equity swaps.
4. Restricted Investments
Investments in the petroleum industry, public utilities, and trans-
portation and communications industries are limited to government
parastatals or public companies. Similarly, investments in radio and tele-
vision, forestry, gas distribution and transportation (air/sea) are limited
to Mexicans and Mexican companies. Foreign investors are expressly
excluded from investing in these sectors. Investments by foreign inves-
tors in the extractive and processing industries are limited to forty-nine
percent or thirty-four percent in special cases. Investments in secondary
petrochemical products and automotive parts and components are lim-
ited to forty percent.
Outside the specified categories, foreign investors may hold up to a
forty-nine percent interest in Mexican companies unless otherwise au-
thorized by the NFIC. Such authorizations are granted on a case by case
basis.66 Between April 1986 and March 1987, the NFIC approved trans-
actions involving 1.513 billion dollars of Mexican government debts.'
By the end of 1986, forty-five approvals had been made. These involved
about 631 million dollars of public debts.68
The Mexican program has not come under serious attack from na-
tionalistic Mexican Unions and politicians. This is largely because of
"the widespread but erroneous perception of the programme as a mecha-
nism designed primarily to reduce debt, rather than to stimulate invest-
ment .... "69 Despite the absence of a serious nationalistic attack on the
65. At at 110.
66. The few examples of 100% foreign owned companies in Mexico include IBM, Appl,
and Hewlett Packard.
67. Eighty percent was used for the liquidation of local debts owed to Mexican banks and
the remainder was used for approved productive investments.
68. Schubert, supra note 22, at 12.
69. Report 1104, supra note 2, at 104.
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program, its potential inflationary side effects have been a source of con-
cern. It has been suggested that for every 100 million dollars of debt
swapped, inflation increases by about three to five percent. 70
Another issue which has aroused great concern is "round tripping."
Round tripping involves the repatriation of the peso proceeds of debt
conversions out of the country. To avoid this, peso conversions are kept
in pledged government securities and in controlled accounts. They are
directly disbursed to the investors, their suppliers, contractors, creditors,
and other beneficiaries upon approval of their invoices and receipts by
the Ministry of Finance. Chile controls round tripping by limiting the
amounts of debt available at the monthly auctions for capitalization by
local investors. It also monitors the local foreign exchange market
closely. Any offenders are prosecuted after the fact. Both Brazil and
Argentina have at different times suspended provisions for local investor
participation in the swap program due to currency speculation. The
Mexican authorities have expressed an inclination to do the same should
they encounter these problems. Such a step, however, could deny the
local investors the benefits of the program. Also, it would make it impos-
sible for the country to encourage the repatriation of private Mexican
funds invested abroad.
Since Mexico suspended its debt equity scheme in October 1987, it
has not been reinstated. By the end of that year, total debts converted
amounted to approximately 1.1 billion dollars, about two percent of
Mexico's total medium-term bank debt. In suspending the scheme, the
Mexican authorities expressed concern about its inflationary side effects
and especially the increase in domestic cash flow. The government's de-
cision to suspend the program was also influenced by the increase in dis-
counts on Mexican debt, which was believed to be more beneficial to
foreign investors, and also by the impact of conversions on the allocation
of new investments.
E. The Philippines
The Philippine program was proposed on July 24, 1986, pursuant to
Executive Order 32. Implementation of the program was carried out
under Central Bank Circular 1111, which was issued on August 4, 1986,
and amended on October 20, 1987. The amended Circular 1111 states
the objectives of the program as: (1) stimulation of long-term equity in-
vestments in the Philippines; (2) repatriation by Philippine nationals of
their overseas capital holdings; (3) provision of investments incentives in
70. Id.
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particular sectors of the economy; and (4) reduction of the debt servicing
burden on the country. One of the principal objectives of the amendment
was to increase the amount of discount "captured" by the Philippine au-
thorities. This was accomplished by introducing a schedule of fees and
new money requirements. Also, the payment of conversion fees from the
peso proceeds of conversions was prohibited. Consequently, if an inves-
tor is unable to obtain local currency to pay for the fees, he must bring in
foreign exchange to do so. In addition to the above, the amendment to
Circular 1111 included amounts under the 1985 New Money Agreement
to the list of debts eligible for conversion. In February 1988, the Philip-
pine authorities also introduced several policy changes in respect to the
implementation of the debt equity swap program. These include limiting
the amount of central bank debt paper converted under the program (to
contain the inflationary impact of debt conversion), waiving fees for con-
version involving private sector debts, and establishing guidelines for the
evaluation of applications for debt conversion. The guidelines required,
inter alia, eighty percent of the goods produced be for export, exemption
of export products from foreign quotas, the contribution of the invest-
ment in the creation of employment, and the location of the investment
in less industrialized areas.
1. Eligible Investments
There are two categories of eligible investments under the program:
Schedule 2 and Schedule 3 investments.71 Schedule 2 investments are
high priority investments and consist of activities such as banking, manu-
facturing of goods for export, provision of health care, the construction
of health care facilities, the construction and maintenance of low and
middle-income housing projects and educational facilities, the rendering
of technical and professional services in exchange for foreign currency,
and the acquisition and management of nonperforming assets disposed of
by the Asset Privatization Trust and the Office of the President.72 Sched-
ule 3 investments are lower priority projects and include technical and
professional services which are paid for in local currency and the produc-
tion of nonagricultural goods for domestic use.
71. See Program for the Conversion of Philippine Eternal Debt Into Equity Investments,
Bangko Sentral NG Pilipinas, Circular 1111, ch. IV, § 13 (1986) (Phil.) [hereinafter Circular
1111].
72. The Asset Privatization Trust was established by Presidential Decree 50, which was
signed on December 9, 1986. It was charged with the responsibility of disposing of
nonperforming assets of questionable projects undertaken during the Marcos era. See Report
1104, supra note 2, at 130; Kwan, Converting Debt To Equity In Philippine Enterprises, E.
ASIAN EXEC. RPp., Mar. 15, 1988, at 21.
19891
Hastings Int'l and Comparative Law Review
Schedule 2 investments are subject to less onerous restrictions and
lower fees because of their priority status. This is illustrated by the fact
that in practice, the commercial banks participating in the program think
that
the Central Bank has taken a very restrictive approach to approvals, in
most instances approving only Schedule 2 preferred investments, and
even then only the ones that are directly on target. Central Bank
figures show that as [of] May 12, 1987, only seven Schedule 3 or non-
priority investments were approved, whereas some [fifty-three] pre-
ferred activities received authorisation. 73
2. Procedure
To participate in the program, interested investors (of any national-
ity) must submit a triplicate application to the Central Bank's Office of
Debt Restructuring (ODR). The main function of the ODR is to review
the applications and forward them with its recommendations to the
Monetary Board, which approves the applications. Even though the
Monetary Board is not bound by the recommendations of the ODR, it
usually follows them. 7
4
Within forty-five days of filing an application, an investor may know
the fate of the application. When an application is rejected, the investor
may reapply at another time. If the transaction is approved, the investor
has sixty days to close the transaction unless ODR grants a special exten-
sion. In the absence of such an extension, the approval automatically
lapses.7 1 On the closing date of the transaction, the purchased debt pa-
per is deemed to be redenominated into its peso equivalent at the Central
Bank's buying rate and the obligor is required to pay the investor the
peso equivalent.76
Some factors which may influence the approval or nonapproval of a
particular investment include its contribution to the generation of foreign
exchange for the country, its role in the creation of job opportunities,
how it increases economic activity, and the amount of local materials
used in the manufacturing process.77 These factors also determine the
classification of the investment as either high or low priority.
73. Report 1104, supra note 2, at 125-26.
74. Id. at 136-37.
75. See Circular 1111, supra note 71, ch. XI, § 21.
76. Id. at ch. XI, § 23.
77. Report 1104, supra note 2, at 136.
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3. Fees
The investor is required to pay an initial application fee of 10,000
pesos (about 500 dollars) and a closing fee based on the proceeds of the
converted debts. The amount charged depends on how the investment is
funded. For example, where the investment does not involve any new
funds, the Central Bank's fee in the case of Schedule 2 investments is
twenty percent of the peso proceeds, while a Schedule 3 investment at-
tracts twenty-four percent of the proceeds of the converted debts. Sched-
ule 2 investments involving new funds up to fifty percent of the project
cost are exempt from any fees. On the other hand, Schedule 3 invest-
ments require up to sixty percent of new funds to be eligible for the fee
exemption. Also, the use of qualified debts of Philippine private sector
borrowers or obligors in financing investments attract no fees.
4. Eligible Debts
Debts eligible for redemption under the program are classified into
categories A, B, C, and D.11 Category A includes all the principal matu-
rities of foreign debts covered by a Restructuring Agreement. Category
B consists of two classes of debt: (1) all principal maturities of external
debts owed by Philippine public sector borrowers falling due on or after
January 1, 1987 (other than debt covered by a Restructuring Agreement
or New Money Agreement); and (2) all principal maturities owed by
Philippine private sector borrowers, provided that the debt instruments
permit prepayment or extinguishment of such debts through the delivery
of an equivalent amount inpesos, or the appropriate creditors consent to
such prepayment. Also included are, the maturities of any debts in cate-
gory B which qualify for conversion, provided such debts are discharged
in accordance with the terms of the restructuring agreement."9
Category C debts are credits covered by a trade facility, including
deposits maintained by the Central Bank."0 Under the policy changes
introduced in February 1988, short-term trade facilities were excluded
from the list of debts eligible for conversion. Category D is comprised of
other debt obligations, the terms and conditions of which are approved
by the Monetary Board.
5. Restrictions
An investment's classification determines its restrictions. Higher
78. See Circular 1111 supra note 71, ch. III, § 4, and sched. 1.
79. Id sched. 1.
80. A trade facility is a loan agreement used purposely to finance trade.
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priority Schedule 2 investments are subject to fewer restrictions than
Schedule 3 investments. Schedule 2 investments are only charged a five
percent commission instead of ten percent. Investors making Schedule 2
investments cannot repatriate their capital within the first three years of
the investment. But, after the fourth year, they are allowed to repatriate
twenty percent of their capital. There are no restrictions on the repatria-
tion of dividends accruing from such investments. On the other hand,
investors in nonpriority Schedule 3 investments cannot repatriate their
capital within the first five years of the investment. However, on the
sixth year, they can repatriate twenty percent of their capital. Repatria-
tion of dividends from Schedule 3 investments is not allowed within the
first four years. Also, such dividends are not guaranteed. Local inves-
tors are not allowed to repatriate or remit their capital, profits or divi-
dends overseas. An investor in any category may sell his interest in the
transaction and transfer his stock to another person two years after the
closing of the transaction.
In the event of liquidation or dissolution of the Philippine enterprise
in which the investment was made, if the amount paid to the investor
exceeds the amount allowed to be repatriated the investor has two op-
tions. The investor may reinvest the excess in an approved equity invest-
ment or in a nontransferable peso denominated Central Bank debt
instrument until it can be reinvested in an approved equity investment.
Where the original investment was a Schedule 2 investment, the investor
is expected to place the excess in a Schedule 2 investment.
6. Philippine Investment Notes (PINs)
In July 1987, the Philippine government amended Circular 1111 to
permit the use of Philippine Investment Notes (PINs) in the debt equity
swap program.81 PINs are non-interest-bearing foreign currency denom-
inated obligations of the Central Bank of the Philippines guaranteed by
the Government. 2 PINs have a normal maturity of six years from the
date of issue. They are also easily transferable to financial or nonfinan-
cial institutions. Also, they may be redeemed anytime before maturity
for full value in Philippine pesos and the proceeds may be used in financ-
ing equity investments. PINs are not subject to any fees by the Central
Bank. They are usually issued to correspond with interest payments due
81. See PINs and needles, THE ECONOMIST, Mar. 14, 1987, at 75-76.
82. The guarantees used under the PINs program may take the form of unconditional
obligations of the central bank to pay a certain amount of foreign exchange to the registered
holder of the PIN upon maturity or a certification that the instrument is redeemable at any
time before maturity for full value in pesos used for financing an equity investment.
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under the Philippine Public Sector Restructuring Agreements and the
925 million dollar Credit Agreement of May 20, 1985. They are issued
and sold through underwriting or placement arrangements with third
parties. They may also be sold at discounts from their face value accord-
ing to current market prices. The Central Bank records all PIN
transactions.
Since the introduction of the PIN program, it has become
mandatory for investors to use them (the PINs) to finance part of their
investments in the Phillipines. Schedules 2 and 3 require about twenty-
five percent and fifty percent PIN financing respectively. As a result of
the requirement that PINs be used, discounts on PINs are not as attrac-
tive as those available on secondary market credits.83 Unlike the conver-
sion of eligible Central Bank debt for investments, no redemption fees are
charged for PINs. PIN investments for 1988 are estimated at between
100 to 150 million dollars.
The PIN program possesses several advantages over an ordinary
debt equity swap transaction. The program ensures the availability of
fresh foreign exchange and carries a lesser risk of inflationary side effects.
Secondly, it is less expensive for prospective investors because there are
no redemption fees. It also obviates the necessity of seeking the consent
of the relevant creditors and preparing different assignment agreements
with the interested sellers. In short, it is less time consuming. Further-
more, it may be used to make up for any future shortages in Philippine
government debt paper.
The redemption of the PINs... represent[s] immediate cash savings
for the country of the amount of foreign exchange corresponding to a
current interest payment on the external debts. [Furthermore,] [t]lis
type of debt service relief is much greater than that resulting from a
conventional debt equity transaction involving an item of restructured
debt. In the later case, since the principal amount of the credit subject
to redemption has already been rescheduled over a long term, the bor-
rower nation saves not only the amount of interest that would have
accrued on the credit had it remained outstanding. The benefit of can-
celling restructured indebtedness is, therefore, somewhat attenuated. 4
83. Report 1104, supra note 2, at 125.
84. Ird at 139.
1989]
Hastings Int'l and Comparative Law Review
IV. REGULATORY ASPECTS OF DEBT EQUITY
SWAP TRANSACTIONS
A. United States
Prior to August 1987, the participation of United States banks in
nonfinancial companies through debt conversions was limited to twenty
percent of the company's equity.85 Before the amendment of Regulation
K, the participation of United States banks in nonfinancial activities
caused considerable concern. The concern was based on: 1) the banks'
lack of expertise; and 2) a fear that the banks would help their nonfinan-
cial affiliates by granting loans on nonmarket terms. By limiting the
holding of shares to Bank Holding Companies, the commercial banks are
insulated from the commercial activities of the companies in which they
hold interests. Thus, any loans they grant to entities are treated as in-
vestments in the company.8 6 Accordingly, the appropriate approval pro-
cedures have to be followed with respect to such investments. In August
1987, the Federal Reserve Board (FRB) amended Regulation K which
had limited the holding of any interests in nonfinancial companies over-
seas. Presently, United States banks can hold up to 100 percent equity
interests in nonfinancial companies in LDC's that have reduced their
debts since 1980, as long as the investments are made in state-owned
enterprises that are in the process of being privatized.
The amendments expanded section 211.5(b) of Regulation K to per-
mit United States banks to hold up to 100 percent equity interests in
foreign nonfinancial companies in the thirty-three heavily indebted coun-
tries. The shares obtained by the bank in the conversion must be shares
of government agencies and instrumentalities."7 The new Regulation K
does not permit conversion of debt for equity in foreign nonfinancial
companies not owned by government. The FRB's commentary clearly
stipulates that the acquired shares must be government owned. Conse-
quently, it will not suffice for the foreign government to acquire the
shares only for the purpose of transferring them to the Bank Holding
Company in a debt equity conversion. The FRB's commentary states
that "private investment in such companies that are currently state
owned may provide some benefit to the countries by reducing economic
inefficiencies and governmental subsidies."88
85. 12 C.F.R. § 211.5 (1988).
86. Id. § 211.5(f)(2)(ii).
87. Id. § 211.5(f)(1)(i).
88. Spencer, Regulation KAllows 100 Percent Ownership, INT'L. FIN. L. REv., Oct. 1987,
at 13 (quoting the FRB commentary).
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. The acquired interest in the company may be evidenced by shares or
"other ownership interest." 9  The acquisition of a foreign company's
shares may be through conversion of eligible debt claims or through pay-
ment in local currency, with the proceeds being used to acquire the
shares." A bank may also own interest in a company not issuing shares.
The interests acquired in the foreign company must be held by the
Bank Holding Company or its subsidiaries and not by a United States
insured bank or its subsidiaries. 91
Asset transfers from banks to their Holding Companies and the con-
version of assets from debt to equity could lead to recognition of losses
for tax and reporting purposes. The same is true of portfolio valuations.
1. Subcategory Restrictions
Regulation K also imposes certain restrictions on the acquired com-
pany. First, the acquired corporation shall not have a name similar to
that of the acquiring bank. According to the FRB's commentary,
[t]he restrictions on the sharing of a similar name by the US banking
organization and its non-bank affiliate reduce[s] the likelihood that a
bank [will] be identified with the nonbank company and thereby re-
duce[s] the pressure on a banking organisation to support the affiliate
in case of losses. 92
Secondly, the Bank Holding Company and the affiliate are forbidden
to provide the acquired foreign company with any confidential informa-
tion regarding their customers or other affiliates engaged in a similar or
related business. As a general rule, the acquired company cannot di-
rectly or indirectly engage in trade or business in the United States.93
The commentary on section 211.5(b), however, provides that there may
be a few interlocking directors for administrative purposes when
necessary.
The acquiring banks are expected to divest themselves of their inter-
ests in the affiliate corporation within five years. Extensions of up to five
additional years may be granted by the FRB if good cause is shown.94
89. 12 C.F.R. § 211.5(f)(2) (1988).
90. Id § 211.5(f)(1)(ii).
91. Id. § 211.5(f)(1)(iii).
92. Id. § 211.5 (f)(3)(i); Spencer, supra note 88, at 14.
93. 12 C.F.R. §§ 211.5(f)(1)(v), 211.5(b)(3)(i)(A) and (B) (1988).
94. Id. § 211.5(f)(1)(iv).
1989]
Hastings Int'l and Comparative Law Review
B. Japanese Regulations
Regulatory changes have also been made in Japan, especially in the
tax treatment of debt equity swaps involving non-Japanese banks. The
Japanese authorities have ruled that debt equity conversions made out in
single and integrated transactions are exempt from capital gains taxes
even if the debts are converted at or near face value. This is a good
incentive to encourage the participation of Japanese banks in debt equity
swaps.
C. Valuing Debt
The balance sheet treatment of debt equity conversions is of consid-
erable importance to creditor banks engaging in such transactions." One
of the major concerns of banks engaged in debt conversion is the valua-
tion of the remainder of their debts. In May 1985 the American Institute
of Certified Accountants (AICPA) stated, "in art exchange involving
loans to debtors in such financially troubled countries, the estimated cur-
rent face value of the consideration given and received will be less than
the respective face of the loans and other considerations." Assuming
that, this generally results in a loss. Many banks fear that conversion
may contaminate the remainder of the unconverted debts in their portfo-
lio. In this respect, the AICPA notice stated, that "in the course of
preparing financial statements, a bank must review the loan portfolio in
order to assess the adequacy of the allowance for loan losses." This is
because private sector nonguaranteed debt treats each of the obligor's
debts separately while private and public sector debt guaranteed by gov-
ernments are treated together. Thus, the risk of contamination is consid-
ered to be greater for (public sector and private debt) guaranteed debt.
V. THE IMPACT OF DEBT EQUITY CONVERSIONS
The impact of the debt equity conversions differs from country to
country and scheme to scheme.96 Benefits of debt equity schemes may be
obtained through the imposition of conversion fees, sale or auctioning of
conversion rights or the establishment of different exchange rates for the
conversions. Most of the countries engaged in debt equity conversions
have established formal procedures by which they benefit from discounts
in the secondary market.
Debt equity swap schemes promote increased domestic investments
95. See generally Schwarz, supra note 2, at 87-97.
96. For a discussion of the economic impact of debt equity swaps, see International Capi-
tal Markets, supra note 3, at 59.
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and enhance foreign exchange savings. When there is no significant in-
crease in foreign savings, that could result in a crowding out of invest-
ments to make funds available for early repayment. Because of this,
some countries require the provision of matching funds.97
Debt equity conversions help to reduce debtor countries' external
debts because they eliminate the payment of interest and restructuring
fees. These are however, replaced by remittance and repatriation of prof-
its. Since these are subject to considerable restrictions, it is arguable that
they do not have as severe an impact on the economies of these countries
as debt servicing does. Also, because converted debts are usually ex-
cluded from the calculation of bank base exposure, it may be more bene-
ficial for banks to engage in debt equity conversions than frequent
rescheduling of debt, which requires the provision of new money to
debtor countries.
Issuance of domestic currency to pay for debt conversion might also
have an adverse impact on the monetary and fiscal policies pursued by
the countries. The impact may be felt in inflation, exchange rates and the
level of debtor countries international reserves. For example, debt con-
versions involving bonds could cause a rise in interest rates as well as
make it difficult for debtor countries to meet the International Monetary
Fund's inflation targets.
Issuance of company stock and long term debt instruments is a use-
ful means of controlling the consequences of increased domestic currency
flow. Another effective way of control is the institution of volume re-
strictions on exchanges.
Debt equity swap programs encourage the repatriation of private
capital of nationals which has been invested abroad and also promote
investment of foreign capital. For example, it is estimated that between
1985 and 1987 about 385 million dollars of private Chilean capital
abroad was repatriated to Chile through debt equity conversions involv-
ing Chilean nationals.98
Although United States financial institutions were initially reluctant
to participate in debt equity swaps, many have now changed their minds
and have begun to participate actively as brokers of debt paper and also
by converting some of their own debts into investments. Manufacturers
Hanover, Bankers Trust, Security Pacific, American Express, and Cit-
icorp have all made substantial debt equity swaps. Manufacturers Hano-
ver recently exchanged about 70 million dollars of its Brazilian debts for
97. Argentina is one such country.
98. Schubert, supra note 22, at 14.
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60.4 million dollars of cruzados for investment in a pulp and paper com-
pany in Brazil. It is also negotiating another investment of about 30 mil-
lion dollars in another paper and pulp factory.99 In all, Manufacturers
Hanover expects to convert at least 150 million dollars of its loans into
direct investments in Brazil."°° Recently, Bankers Trust bought the con-
trolling interest in Provida, Chile's largest pension fund manager and
Consanico, Chile's biggest life insurance company. It has also purchased
a gold mine in Chile. 10 1 As of January 1987, Bankers Trust's debt equity
swap transactions were valued at about 100 million dollars. 10 2 Citicorp
is exploring the prospects of purchasing fishing fleets and a port in
Chile.103 American Express declared its intention to buy seventeen per-
cent of a Brazilian textile company in addition to swapping debts in ex-
change for investments in seven Mexican hotels.'t 4 Security Pacific
bought a Chilean electrical company through a debt equity swap transac-
tion. The above examples represent new investments which perhaps
would not have been made in the absence of debt conversion
programs. 10 5
Several commentators and bankers have expressed positive com-
ments about debt equity swap programs and their great potential. For
example, Mr. Newman of Sherson Lehman Hutton said, "[o]ver the next
five to ten years, debt-for-equity conversions will probably become the
single largest use of sovereign debt."' 1 6 Richard Marin, head of Bankers
Trust's asset enhancement operation in New York siated "[d]ebt/equity
swapping is the hottest game in town."' 0 7
Through debt equity swap programs, debtor countries are able to
capture discounts on debts sold on the secondary market and convert
such debts into investments. These programs encourage debtor countries
to re-evaluate their economic policies, (i.e., the extent of government in-
volvement in economic activities) and foster the expansion of the private
sectors of their economies through privatization of government owned
99. U.S. Bank Swaps Debt For Equity in Brazil, Wall St. J., June 30, 1988, at 19, col. 2.
100. Id.
101. Evans, Bankers Proceed Cautiously with Debt/Equity Strategy, EUROMONEY, Jan.
1988, at 13.
102. Evans, supra note 2, at 100.
103. Id. at 100-01.
104. Id. at 100.
105. Cf. Schubert, supra note 22, at 19; Donald Lessard argues that "when a major mul-
tinational invests in a... country via a debt/equity swap, it probably has a pretty good invest-
ment opportunity which it might undertake anyway. The percentage discount on the cost of
the investment may be important, but I doubt if it is a convincing ractor." Id
106. Id. at 85.
107. See Evans, supra note 101, at 6.
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enterprises. For the bank creditors, debt equity swaps offer the opportu-
nity to get rid of problem loans, to increase liquidity, and to rationalize
their portfolios.
VI. COMPARISON
Under most of the debt equity programs discussed above, the eligi-
ble investors include banks, multinational corporations, and domestic
and foreign debt holders. One notable exception is the Brazilian pro-
gram, which limits eligible investors to the original creditors. Prior to
June 1984, any nonresident could participate in the Brazilian program.
It is now open to domestic investors as well. In Chile, Argentina, Mex-
ico, and the Philippines, any resident or nonresident creditor may partici-
pate in the program. Eligible debts in the countries include both private
and public sector debts.
Restrictions on capital repatriation and profit remittances exist in all
the five countries. However, since March 1987, regulations in Brazil re-
quire that any investment made via debt conversion must remain in the
country for at least twelve years before becoming eligible for repatria-
tion.10 8 In Chile, Argentina, the Phillipines, and Mexico, debt conver-
sion restrictions relating to the remittance of profits are more restrictive
than the restrictions for other forms of foreign investment.
Debts for conversion are valued at either face value or below face
value. The countries which permit the redemption of debts at face value
are Brazil and the Phillipines. In the latter, conversion fees are charged
for such debts. On the other hand, in Chile, Argentina, and Mexico, the
debts are converted at a value below face value.
The exchange rate for debt conversion is either at the official ex-
change rate or at parallel exchange rates. Of the five program examined,
Argentina and Mexico use a parallel exchange rate (the free market ex-
change rate), while Brazil, Chile, and the Phillipines convert debts at the
official exchange rate.
Argentina, Chile, and Mexico have debt conversion programs which
require additional funds. In Mexico, this requirement only relates to in-
vestments in nonpriority sectors. In Chile, the requirement is not always
enforced and when it is, it is usually only a small percentage of the
investment. 109
In the countries studied in this Article either the Central Bank or
the Ministry of Finance administer the program. For example, in Argen-
108. International Capital Markets, supra note 3, at 61.
109. Report 1104, supra note 2, at 100.
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tina and Mexico, the Ministry of Finance plays a crucial role in the ad-
ministration of the program. In Argentina, the Central Bank works in
conjunction with the Ministry of Finance, whereas in Mexico, the Minis-
try of Finance is assisted by the Foreign Investment Commission. The
other three countries' programs are basically administered by their Cen-
tral Banks.
Debt conversion programs can facilitate government efforts at priva-
tization. Chile, for example, has used the program to undertake an ex-
tensive privatization program. The Phillipines, too, has used its program
to sell the nonperforming assets of government owned businesses. Mex-
ico and Brazil have also achieved modest success in using their debt con-
version program to advance privatization. Compared to the Chilean
program, however, the Mexican and Brazilian privatization programs
may at best be described as incipient. Even though Argentina has a
privatization program it has not extensively used debt equity swaps to
further its program. 110
VII. CONCLUSION
The above programs display a variety of options. Some are very
strict, others are fairly liberal. The differences exhibited in the various
programs reflect different attitudes towards foreign investment. For ex-
ample, some of the programs require matching funds to offset the impact
of early retirement of debts, while others do not. The programs are tai-
lored to meet the economic needs of the various countries. Notwith-
standing the existence of slight variations, all the programs allow the
conversion of both private and public sector debts and also impose re-
strictions on the remittance of profits, dividends, and the repatriation of
capital. These restrictions are tighter than those on other types of foreign
investments. Furthermore, debts are usually retired at face value even
though they are purchased at generous discounts.
While debt equity swaps offer debtor countries a good opportunity
to retire their debts, they also raise serious problems, such as the fear of
domination of the economy by foreign investors, inflation, and increased
domestic debts. The reactions of debtor countries to these issues are usu-
ally reflected in the structure and restrictions of their debt equity swap
programs. Although these concerns warrant attention, they do not re-
quire massive regulation. Such a step could scare prospective investors
away to countries with more liberal programs. Debt equity swap pro-
grams must be seen as attempts by both debtor countries and creditor
110. Id. at 101.
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banks to make the best of a bad situation. Debtor countries should care-
fully consider the types of incentives they offer to investors, the nature of
the restrictions they impose, and their approval procedures. They should
strive to avoid over regulation and endeavor to simplify the administra-
tive procedures. Of all the programs examined, the Chilean program is
the most liberal, and does not entail as complicated and confusing an
approval process as the others.

